Recent American Foreign Policy

I've been troubled by the direction of American foreign policy ever since Colin Powell announced he would be paying a visit to Yasser Arafat. I've read the arguments of Judd and Den Beste that the move is a transparently symbolic one that is to appease the Arab world when what really matters is that U.S. policymakers have given Sharon a wink and a nod to continue his own counterterror offensive, as well as Den Beste's suggestion that it's ultimately an effort to lay the groundwork for action against Iraq and, perhaps, Saudi Arabia.

Unfortunately, decades of State Department Arab-Israeli "peacemaking" suggest to me that Judd and Den Beste may have entirely too much optimism that Bush is playing a sophisticated (?!) game of realpolitique. The longtime Arab inclination of the State Department has been well documented in a little-known book of Robert Kaplan, The Arabists, and if anything that inclination towards Middle East "peacemaking" (kingmaking?) has accelerated since its publication. Simply put, the "process" of making peace drives the State Department beyond all else. For the most part, the careerists at the State Department really don't care much about the verifiability of agreements (look at some of the Congressional testimony on SALT II for an example) or whether one party is likely to uphold their end of the agreement. It's all about the piece of paper. Who cares if Israel's narrow waist (absent the West Bank) represents an intolerable loss of strategic depth so long as the Oslo agreement is inked?! That's the mentality at State.

And for a generally dull thinker like Colin Powell, the careerists at State can have enormous influence. I don't think Powell has been set up by foreign policy conservatives in the Administration (as Judd suggests). Rather, I think the careerists at State have impressed upon him that Arafat is the only person with whom he might reach agreement. And the agreement is the endgame at State. It's ALL about the agreement. Never mind that it will be worthless, like every other agreement Arafat has made.

But even assuming I'm overly cynical if not entirely wrong -- Is it a particularly good idea for there to be too many instances in which the rhetoric of American foreign policy does not match the goals and action? A nod and a wink to Sharon accompanied by demands for him to stop is muddled. It gives the Arab world ammunition and encouragement. And if one buys into the description of the Arab mentality offered by David Pryce-Jones in his classic The Closed Circle, it encourages Arabs to create reality from delusion. American policymakers should keep in mind the Pryce-Jones formulation that the Arab mind often constructs reality to conform with its predispositions -- and that those predispostions are not always rational in a Western sense (Charles Johnson has compiled some recent examples). That makes it even more important to send unambiguous signals in terms of action and rhetoric. And the United States has failed in that task lately, because the action and rhetoric of the whole Middle East/Israel/Arafat/Powell gambit just can't be squared, as James Taranto noted in his Best of the Web today:

The big question about Colin Powell's trip is this: Does he believe what he's saying, or is he merely telling his European and Arab audiences what they want to hear while the administration tacitly supports Israel and prepares to strike Iraq? Consider the secretary's comments in Madrid yesterday, reported by Ha'aretz:

"However long the Israeli incursion continues, the problems will still be there," Powell said, adding that even if Israel is effective, "there will still be people willing to resort to violence and suicide bombings. . . . The violence and anger and frustration which feeds that will still be there unless we find a negotiating process" that leads to a Palestinian state.

And while Sharon and Netanyahu both have said Yasser Arafat must go, the Associated Press also quotes Powell as saying, "He is the partner that Israel will have to deal with."

It's far from an original observation that this is exactly the opposite of the attitude the Bush administration took toward the Taliban and al Qaeda. America didn't negotiate with Mullah Omar; it issued an ultimatum and took military action when the Taliban failed to meet its demands.

As for speculation that the U.S. is planning any real action against Saudi Arabia, I'm afraid that's probably wildly optimistic. Although they've largely kept a lid on it (for obvious reasons), this is a pro-Saudi administration, and that orientation starts at the top (Prince Bandar not to mention other Saudi royals go way back with the Bush family) and the #2 spot (Cheney is another Bandar intimate). It's highly unlikely this administration is going to do anything to destabilize the ruling Saudis, and everything to help ensure their stability. That may be a mistake, but the combination of old ties to the Saudi royals and fear over what might replace them is going to drive that policy, no matter how much we speculate (or hope) otherwise.

[Posted at 22:49 CST on 04/11/02] [Link]