27 September 2001

How to Think About International Politics - 2

When thinking about international politics -- or really any topic -- it is important to understand the objects of study on their own terms, rather than refracting them through a methodological prism PRIOR TO analysis. In practice, that means when we study the behavior of other nations towards each other -- international politics -- we must be careful NOT to ascribe Western values, or even Western rationality, to those nations prior to evaluating their actual behavior.

Certainly, we do need to consider that a given nation may be behaving according to our own norms and values. But we also should always consider a nation's strategic interests in light of its own norms and values, and evaluate its behavior in terms of how it might serve those strategic interests. This is not to suggest that all state behavior is crudely directed towards strategic interests, and it is indeed true that at times, a confluence of events may align said nation's strategic interests with the interests, norms, and values of other nations. The trick, of course, is figuring out when this is -- and is not -- the case. Sometimes it cannot be ascertained until well after the fact. Such is the nature of international politics.

I'd like to use an article recently published on National Review Online to illustrate the points above, for I would contend that it is somewhat guilty of imposing a framework on some of the facts that ultimately weakens the analysis. The article is entitled "Putin Steers Russia West: Becoming a Crucial Ally and Partner" and is written by Ariel Cohen, a research fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation.

Cohen's contention is that Vladimir Putin, over the objections of Russian hardliners, has moved Russia towards the U.S. position on terrorism originating from Afghanistan for three main reasons: 1) To gain greater freedom to act in Chechnya -- paragraph 20, 2) To protect Russia's neighbors -- paragraph 23, and 3) To effect a strategic breakthrough in Russia's relations with the West -- paragraph 26.

Of these possibilities, the first is certainly well supported by the facts, and may be the key. Earlier this week, numerous press reports noted multiple statements from U.S. officials indicating Russia's need to constrain terrorist activity in Chechnya, despite earlier U.S. concerns of human rights violations there.

The second possibility is plausible, but not quite in the manner Cohen frames it. In paragraph 24, Cohen writes:

The Kremlin viewed with apprehension the growing threat to the secular regime of Uzbekistan's president Islam Karimov by the Islamic Front of Uzbekistan (IMU) led by Juma Namangani, a wanted terrorist who, according to the Russian news agency RIAN-Novosti, was appointed deputy to Bin Laden, thus indicated a possibility of a major attack against Russia's allies.

What Cohen has failed fully to consider are Uzbekistan's strategic interests and values. As noted previously, President Karimov of Uzbekistan would probably be quite surprised at Cohen's description of the nation as one of "Russia's allies." That's why Karimov must be delighted at the prospects of closer ties with the United States -- ties that Uzbekistan would have been well served to form with or without Russian "approval." Certainly, Uzbekistan is of strategic concern to Russia, and Russia is keenly interested in continuing to exert influence there. And no doubt, Russia is interested in squashing the Islamic fundamentalist movement led by Namangani (itself related to Bin Laden's network), since both movements do pose a threat to Russia. But the important strategic interest Cohen does not consider is that Russia has managed to inject itself into Uzbekistan's pseudo-alliance with the United States, thereby exerting influence and staving off a bilateral American-Uzbeki alliance that Russia's "hardliners" would view negatively. If such an alliance was likely to come about regardless of Russia's position, then strategically it makes great sense for Russia to insert itself in the alliance (which allows it more influence than being frozen out altogether), and to score brownie points for its cooperation!

Cohen's third possibility seems a bit optimistic given his facts. Yes, it's true that Putin and Russia will likely ask for "something more substantial" than freedom to act in Chechnya, as Cohen suggests in his paragraph 28. And the West will likely reward Russia financially for behaving as its "ally." But Cohen's intimation that Putin's great goal is to move Russia closer to the West is not at all clear from the facts presented in his 32 paragraphs. What is clear is that Russia does have strategic interests at stake and strategic reasons to behave as it has thus far. It may also be true that Putin genuinely does wish to move Russia closer to the West, and has indeed adopted Western values and modes of thinking. Over time, Russian rhetoric combined with the expenditure of treasure, resources, and perhaps even blood will reveal more definitively which of the two -- or even some combination -- is the case. The key for the perceptive analyst of international politics is to refrain from what was once called "mirror-imaging" (the assumption that other nations behave as one's own) and to continue to consider all of the possibilities, strategic and otherwise, until such evidence becomes more clear.

[Posted @ 10:24 PM CST]