26 March 2001

Explaining Political Behavior

I read an article in the Washington Post today that is worth further comment. The article essentially describes how socioeconomic status over the years has become a much weaker predictor of partisan identification (and political behavior more broadly). As journalism, it's pretty poor: it was obviously written on deadline, it is neither focused nor insightful, and it relies upon too many left-leaning sources. As political science, it's dreadful, since it doesn't probe the implications of the trends it identifies.

Useful background: socioeconomic status was once one of the best predictors of voter behavior. Over time, party affiliation grew to be a better predictor. In contemporary times, that link has weakened, and political scientists have scrambled to explain why. Most of them, unfortunately, never bothered to explain why socioeconomic status itself might be a good predictor of behavior, or party affiliation might be a good predictor after that. Too many quantitiative political scientists were content to argue that they had found their cause, since a correlation existed. But income and party ID aren't causes (in a political-psychological sense), and to hear them described as such by revered political scientists used to drive me crazy. The best explanation I could fashion was that in the earlier years of the republic -- back before the internet and even hundreds of television channels (maybe even before television) -- political information was much harder and much more costly (in terms of time and money) to acquire. One's peer group associations helped people form their political opinions, and thus socioeconomic status was a strong predictor (but not "cause") of individaul political behavior. At some point, political parties served as a way by which individuals cut down the time and monetary costs of acquiring political information -- and thus party ID correlated strongly with political behavior (but did not "cause" the same). But today, we know from quantitative data that those old predictors are much weaker. And the article points this out without understanding the significance:

Battles over abortion, gun control and other cultural values are dramatically reshaping the voting behavior of the American electorate, turning longtime working-class white Democrats into Republicans and moving many affluent whites from the GOP to the party of Roosevelt, according to political analysts and election data.

The transformation of voting patterns over the past three decades has weakened the long-standing link between income and voting among whites. Racial issues such as busing and affirmative action have pushed blue-collar voters into the GOP, at the same time that cultural issues, especially abortion rights, have built Democratic allegiance among white professionals.

In these two paragraphs, the author has pointed out a trend towards issue-oriented politics and away from the longer-standing "interest-group" political model. Of course, in true journalistic fashion, the author muddles things by confusing issues (abortion, gun control) with "other cultural values" (what?!) but we'll not quibble with that. It's more important to ask why this has happened. And it strikes me as so obvious that, of course, academics are completely oblivious: for most people interested in politics, the time and monetary costs of acquiring political information have shrunk to nothing. Mass communication has infiltrated virtually every part of society, to the extent that one has to work NOT to acquire political information. Of course party ID and socioeconomic status have become weaker predictors of individual political behavior (However, they should still serve as fairly valid predictors among the groups of lowest socioeconomic status, since their costs of acquiring political information are still, relatively speaking, high). It's much easier to be informed on single issues today!

If my theory is true, then there are a number of potential implications for the American political system. One is that future political coalitions are likely to be a murky, unpredictable matter. A second is that the traditional two-party system, despite being entrenched because of various rules enacted over the years, has become less than useful, perhaps even outmoded (but since it is so entrenched, might voter apathy be the result as third-parties continue to be frustrated?). A third is that we are not likely again to see the phenomenon known as a "realigning election" (which will certainly frustrate budding grad students in American politics and history, who will nonetheless attempt to "find" one). No doubt there are further implications. It's a real shame that contemporary academia has so little to say on the topic.

[Posted @ 10:51 PM CST]

COMMENTS

I think your theory of the cost of obtaining political information having dwindled down to nothing is an excellent one. It also makes sense that socioeconomic class and party loyalty would have been strong predictors in the past but not so much now. All I can say is, it's going to be more important than ever to make sure all possible views are represented (one more reason to be happy about Fox News!). Good point also about the traditional two-party system becoming less useful now that people can make more personal political choices.

(Um, what's a "realigning election"?)

Your points were all well made, and I have nothing to add or quibble with. I did have some other reactions to the article which I'll share here:

1. Who are those rich folks voting Democratic, and why? My husband had a few theories over IM this morning: "I say, they don't work very hard for their living. They don't have interests that are being attacked by the left. They might think that their taxes will not change significantly, so let's vote for people who "care". I also think that this 'new democrat' that Clinton claimed to be is their ideal. Less govt. with no guilt."

I think there's a point there. I wonder if a lot of it has to do with the relentless liberalism in academia. Upper-middle-class folks tend to be overeducated and have had little exposure to conservative/libertarian theories.

Also, the article says, "In the top half, there has been a realignment of white, well-educated professionals (lawyers, doctors, scientists, academics), now one of the most reliably Democratic constituencies." In other words, people who are out of touch with the realities of middle-class America?

2. What's this about "Racial issues such as busing and affirmative action have pushed blue-collar voters into the GOP"? Is this true? The writer doesn't cite any statistics, he just throws that out. It sounds like a knee-jerk presumption about how GOP folks think.

3. Is "the Democratic Party of Harry S. Truman" the same Democratic party we have today? I get irritated with people who presume that the parties today are identical to what they were decades ago. Didn't the Democrats used to be all about states' rights? Nothing in this article seems to take positional shifts within the parties into account.
[Posted by Evelynne on 27 March 2001, 02:30 PM CST]